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LAW, SCIENCE, AND HISTORY: 
REFLECTIONS UPON IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
Peggy C. Davis* 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By Joseph Goldstein, Anna 
Freud, Albert J. So/nit, and Sonja Goldstein. New York: The Free 
Press. 1986. Pp. xix, 236. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $8.95. 
"GoldsteinFreudandSolnit" is a common term in the parlance of 
lawyers concerned with child custody and parental rights. It evokes a 
familiar set of beliefs about child development and child placement 
decisionmaking. The term is regularly intoned in family proceedings 
as authority for the view that assuring continuity of care should be the 
virtually exclusive criterion for child placement determinations. It is 
invoked to urge a process of identifying the adult with whom a child is 
primarily bonded - the child's "psychological parent" - and pro-
tecting the permanence and autonomy of the psychological parent-
child relationship.1 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have promoted these beliefs in con-
cise, accessible volumes addressed to legal, child welfare, and mental 
health professionals. 2 In the legal context, the authors' goal has been 
"to provide a basis for critically evaluating and revising [consistently 
with their beliefs about psychological parenthood] the procedure and 
substance of court decisions, as well as statutes."3 In this, they have 
had notable success. The theories and recommendations of these 
scholars have stimulated a significant, albeit incomplete, restructuring 
of statutes and common law governing child placement decisionmak-
ing.4 The effect of psychological parent theory upon legislative 
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.A. 1964, Western College for 
Women; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School. - Ed. Support for the preparation of this review and 
for research concerning the Civil War Amendments was provided by the Filomen d' Agostine and 
Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law. 
1. It is also invoked - rightly, but too infrequently - to urge haste in determining child 
placement issues. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 40-49 (1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. 
2. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note l; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, 
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). Sonja Goldstein was not an author of the 
earlier works. 
3. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 5. 
4. See Davis, "There Is A Book Out ... ·~ An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative 
Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987) [hereinafter Davis]; Taub, Assessing the Impact of Gold-
stein, Freud, and So/nit's Proposals: An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 485 (1983-84). 
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schemes has been complex and interesting. 5 Its effect upon judicial 
applications and elaborations of law has been more controversial. 6 
Like other conspicuous demonstrations of the power of a scientific the-
ory to influence the law, the impact of psychological parent theory 
upon judicial decision making has led - predictably and appropri-
ately - to concern about the processes by which outcomes are deter-
mined and changes in law are effected. 
Professors Goldstein and Solnit are distinguished legal scholars, 
and their view that judge-made law must change in response to psy-
chological parent theory is expressed with an uncommon sophistica-
tion about legal process. That sophistication has been enriched by 
their frequent participation in child placement litigation. However, 
the earlier books of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were not critiques of 
legal process, but works of advocacy. In the course of advocating law 
reform, these authors were mindful, but not critical, of the processes 
by which scientific theory affects legal decisionmaking. They dis-
played the legal technician's proficiency at marshalling and character-
izing precedent to facilitate a desired result, and spoke eloquently of 
the process: 
There is in law, as psychoanalysis teaches that there is in man, a rich 
residue which each generation preserves from the past, modifies for the 
now, and in turn leaves for the future. Law is, after all, a continuous 
process for meeting society's need for stability by providing authority 
and precedent and, at the same time, meeting its need for flexibility and 
change by providing for each authority a counterauthority and for each 
precedent a counterprecedent. The living law thus seeks to secure an 
environment conducive to society's healthy growth and development. 7 
They also argued that, regardless of the availability of controlling 
"counterprecedent," judges are justified in providing for "the now" by 
modifying rules of law "[ o ]n the basis of knowledge extrapolated from 
[the social sciences]."S 
In the Best Interests of the Child addresses more carefully the 
processes by which judges, in collaboration with lawyers and social 
scientists, apply and alter law. Its prescription for assuring just and 
accurate results in those collaborations is a scrupulous attention to 
interdisciplinary boundaries (pp. 120-21). The central message of the 
book is that professionals involved in child welfare matters must be 
disciplined to work within the limitations of their respective fields. 
The book concludes with two appendices: Stephen Gould's scath-
5. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1569-79; Taub, supra note 4; Garrison, Why Terminate Paren-
tal Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 449-53 (1983). 
6. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1593-98. 
7. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 80-81. 
8. Id. at 94. 
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ing critique of Buck v. Bell, 9 and a poignant passage from The Autobi-
ography of Malcolm X. 10 The Gould critique describes a collaboration 
between law and social science in which early (and now discredited) 
teachings of eugenics informed a Supreme Court decision to deny con-
stitutional protection of a fundamental right of family - the right to 
procreate. The Malcolm X passage describes a collaboration between 
law and social science in which child welfare and mental health ex-
perts informed a lower court decision to sever the legal bonds that 
preserved a troubled, but arguably viable, family unit, institutionalize 
the mother, and place the children in various foster and adoptive 
homes. The appendices receive little attention in the text. These pow-
erful and powerfully told stories are simply offered; their implications 
for lawyers and scientists working across disciplinary boundaries are 
not probed. Yet, by their independent force, they enrich our under-
standing of the dimensions of difficulty involved in integrating law and 
science without sacrificing justice or oversimplifying notions of 
accuracy. 
This review essay consists of two parts. Part I examines the 
boundary adherence techniques advocated in In the Best Interests of 
the Child and discusses their potential as controls against inappropri-
ate judicial incorporation or rejection of scientific knowledge. It ar-
gues that when science becomes relevant to lawyering or to judging, it 
is wise, but insufficient, to leave the law to the legal professionals and 
the science to the scientists. The difficulties of assuring just and accu-
rate results in these interactions require that professionals find objec-
tive measures of the reliability and impartiality of scientific judgments 
and screen out those judgments that fail to meet the measure. 
Part II takes the appendices as a focal point for examining a sec-
ond dimension of difficulty in law-science interactions. The appendi-
ces demonstrate that deference to the teachings of social science can 
lead courts to compromise deeply valued rights of family autonomy. 
Part II argues that lawyering and judging at the borders of law and 
science require recognition of this possibility. It is not sufficient that 
scientific judgments be professionally made and screened for accu-
racy. The shaping and application of law in response to scientific 
truths are complex, multidisciplinary processes that require circum-
spection: for accuracy is elusive, truths are neither timeless nor abso-
lute, and claims of science may be in tension with compelling, 
historically based claims of political and legal theory. The excerpt 
from The Autobiography of Malcolm X describes the destruction of 
9. P. 127, appendix 1 (reprinting Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 93 NATURAL HISTORY 14 
(July 1984)) (examining the lives affected by Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). 
10. P. 142, appendix 2 (reprinting MALCOLM x & A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OP 
MALCOLM X 12-21 (1965)). 
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Malcolm X's family as "modem day slavery."11 The analogy is sur-
prisingly rich. The fourteenth amendment was conceived by people 
who regarded slavery's denial of family rights as a uniquely deplorable 
usurpation of fundamental human entitlements. Rights of family were 
explicitly included among the rights that the fourteenth amendment 
was designed to safeguard. Part II draws upon the slavery analogy to 
offer a previously unrecognized constitutional basis for cautious judi-
cial scrutiny of scientifically supported infringements upon rights of 
family.12 
I. LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSON OF BOUNDARY ADHERENCE 
At one level, the maxim, "Thou shalt not lightly cross professional 
boundaries," has self-evident merit. Few lawyers and judges are pro-
fessionally trained in the sciences. With respect to a child welfare is-
sue, humility vis-a-vis the child development specialist is appropriate. 
Few scientists are professionally trained in the law. With respect to 
questions of law, humility vis-a-vis the legal specialist is appropriate. 
The authors enrich this maxim by adding a valuable corollary. 
When law and science professionals collaborate to resolve a contro-
versy, it is important that they expose particular sorts of professional 
premises that might be relied upon in fashioning a resolution (pp. 58-
59, 74). This technique of explicating premises is applied differently 
with respect to legal and scientific disciplines. 
Scientific experts are encouraged to communicate scientific conclu-
sions fully, and to report any reliance upon lay understandings oflegal 
rules (p. 74). The beliefthat experts must expose scientific premises to 
legal professionals stems from two axioms of legal process. First, sci-
entific judgments may be relevant to the determination of a matter 
under existing legal standards. When this is so, the risk of an errone-
ous determination is reduced to the extent that scientific expertise is 
fully available to legal professionals. Second, law may, and should 
under some circumstances, change to reflect knowledge gleaned from 
the sciences.13 Expert knowledge that appropriately commands ad-
justment of legal rules is, therefore, equally necessary to the lawyering 
and judging functions. 
The authors' insistence that scientists expose reliance upon lay in-
terpretations of the law stems from a wish to avoid inappropriate self-
censorship. The concern is that scientific opinions will be withheld 
because of a belief that legal rules or customs require their rejection 
(pp. 70-74). Self-censorship of this kind would result in withholding 
11. Id. at 146 (reprinting p. 21). 
12. The constitutional theory set forth in Part II provides an alternative to the theory of 
"penumbral" privacy that served as a basis for the elaboration of family rights in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and subsequent cases. 
13. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1540-41. 
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from the legal process potentially useful information. An expert in 
law may see, where a lay person would fail to see, room for incorpora-
tion of scientific knowledge to influence an outcome or to advance 
legal doctrine. 
The authors impose upon law professionals a more limited obliga-
tion to explicate premises. Legal professionals are urged to be explicit 
concerning any scientific premises upon which they may rely (pp. 58-
59). This infrequent but laudable practice is advocated because it ex-
poses lay opinion on scientific questions to critical expert evaluation, 
minimizing the risk that legal determinations will be made on the basis 
of misinformation or uninformed judgment (pp. 58-59). The authors 
do not, however, identify a need to inform scientists of the bases of 
legal judgments. Their only expressed concern with respect to the sci-
entist's understanding of law is that communication of scientific 
knowledge not be deterred by inexpert determinations that the legal 
system cannot, or will not, utilize the information.14 
The value of these prescriptions of boundary adherence and inter-
disciplinary communication is not to be gainsaid. The fault of In the 
Best Interests of the Child is that its focus and structure result in an 
overstatement of that value. The reader is left with an inappropriate 
confidence that justice and children will be served if lawyers lawyer, 
judges judge, and scientists inform. This occurs because the critique of 
interdisciplinary exchanges is compromised by an understandable but 
disabling failure to set aside substantive convictions in the interest of 
assuring rigor in the analysis of process. As we have seen, the authors 
have firm convictions concerning the appropriate disposition of a 
broad category of child placement matters. 15 In broaching the sub-
jects of interdisciplinary boundary adherence and communication, 
they set a goal of objectivity: "We have been careful not to let the 
force of our convictions and the temptation to reinforce the proposals 
we made in the earlier books lead us to find only good practices in 
decisions that we like and only poor practices in decisions we dislike" 
(p. 12). The goal proves elusive. In the Best Interests of the Child 
consists almost entirely of critical reviews of case histories. Good prac-
tices are repeatedly illustrated by decisions that are consistent with the 
authors' convictions.16 Poor practices are repeatedly illustrated by de-
cisions that are inconsistent with the authors' convictions. 17 
This skewed result flags two artificialities in the sample of cases 
14. Pp. 70-74. Part II of this review argues that legal principles require cautious scrutiny of 
scientific claims that are offered to justify compromises of fundamental rights. These legal princi· 
pies should be understood by scientists and taken into account when scientific opinion is mar· 
shalled in the service of legal argument. Law professionals relying upon these principles should 
therefore assume a duty to explicate legal premises for the benefit of the scientific community. 
15. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text 
16. E.g., pp. 44-53, 56-57, 57-62, 62-64, 64-67, 97-98. 
17. E.g., pp. 21-28, 31, 34-37, 70-71, 72-74, 74-78. 
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reviewed in the book. First, the sample is virtually devoid of expert 
evidence that is inconsistent with the authors' positions.18 Only one of 
the cases reviewed involves an expert who holds a professional view 
contrary to those expressed in the earlier works of Goldstein, Freud, 
and Solnit. 19 
Second, professionals who disagree with the authors' child devel-
opment theories are presumed to act without scientific basis, while 
professionals who agree with their theories are presumed to act con-
sistently with scientific wisdom. When legal professionals look beyond 
expert witness advice to reach results that are consistent with psycho-
logical parent theory, they are described as having crossed professional 
boundaries in appropriate ways (pp. 57-67). These legal professionals 
are credited with having properly applied principles of child develop-
ment. 20 Legal professionals who rest their decisions upon indepen-
dently held scientific theories that are inconsistent with the authors' 
positions are condemned for having usurped the clinical role (pp. 21-
37). The possibility of correct reliance upon independently acquired 
expert views that are inconsistent with the views of the authors is not 
considered. The legal professionals involved in these cases have vio-
lated the rule of explication of scientific premises. Whether they have 
silently deferred to extra-record scientific knowledge, we cannot know. 
As a result of these artificialities, the authors have created a uni-
verse in which law and science interact in only three scenarios: 
(1) Law professionals learn from expert witnesses who are almost al-
ways right in their scientific judgments; (2) Law professionals learn 
from reading or associating over time with scientists who are always 
right in their scientific judgments; and (3) As a result of independent 
evaluation of scientific matters, law professionals make scientific judg-
ments that are always wrong. In this universe, all is well if profes-
sional boundaries are respected and law professionals receive, accept, 
and follow the teachings of science. The real world is a different place, 
and the differences are telling. 
18. Pp. 34-37. There is a body of expert opinion that contradicts the authors' views. See 
Davis, supra note 4, at 1545-46. 
19. This expert is a case worker whq is faulted for her failure to seek the advice of a mental 
health professional. Pp. 34-37. All other experts accused of improper practices are doctors and 
social workers who adhered to the views of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, but failed to advance 
those views on the ground that the law, the participating lawyers or the assigned judge was 
hostile to the "right" result. Pp. 70, 72-74, 74-78. These clinicians are criticized for having 
misused knowledge oflaw, such as the fact "that the court 'never' denied fathers the right to visit 
unless ... there was evidence of physical abuse," (pp. 70-71 ); that a particular court demanded 
clinical assessments even when they were useless and detrimental, (pp. 71-72); or that biological 
parents would eventually achieve custody of their children regardless of clinical counterindica-
tions, (p. 73). 
20. The authors commended, for example, a judge's ability to learn "from their work with 
child development experts ... that the custody of a child who has thrived in long-term care with 
the same foster family cannot be changed without harming him." P. 55. 
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A. Expert Witnesses Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right 
One of the greatest mistakes we can make is to regard as simple what is 
complex. If psychiatrists and psychologists knew how to achieve a 
child's best interests, deciding child custody cases would be comparable 
to diagnosing and treating a known medical condition. But psychiatrists 
and psychologists don't know .... 21 
The court quoted above rested its assertion of the fallibility of expert 
judgments upon a record of expert disagreement in the case before it.22 
When a legal matter involves a battle of experts, it is obvious that 
experts can err, and it is inevitable that the legal professionals' ap-
proach to expert evidence will be critical, rather than simply deferen-
tial. This is desirable. The rights of parties and the development of 
law are as easily compromised by deference to mistaken or incomplete 
scientific judgments as by ignorance. 
Unfortunately, evenly matched expert battles are not an inevitable 
feature of the adversary system. This point is particularly telling in 
the context in which the authors consider law and science interactions. 
Child placement matters are rarely litigated with luxurious legal and 
expert resources. Expert evidence is frequently available only to one 
side or only to the court, exercising its power to solicit independent 
professional evaluations. As a result, the maxim of deference to expert 
opinion is not regularly moderated by the reality of conflicting expert 
evidence. 
To recognize the desirability of moderation and amplification of 
the maxim is not to overlook its importance. Deferential and critical 
postures can be consistent. Although the mental health professional is 
less than perfect in her ability to determine the best course of child 
development, her determination is more richly informed than that of a 
lay person. Nevertheless, experts are fallible. Legal professionals are 
obliged, therefore, to be sensitive to factors that affect the reliability of 
expert opinion. 23 
Some of these factors are inherent in adversarial legal process. 
When law and science interactions occur in litigation, there is a risk 
that expert opinion is biased or shaded by the expert's association with 
one of the competing adversaries. There is the additional risk that 
resource imbalances will preclude or impede challenges of expert evi-
dence offered by the more richly endowed litigator. 
Other risk factors are inherent in the scientific process. The want 
of omniscient experts requires sensitivity to the risks that expert opin-
ion is biased for reasons that precede the assumption of an adversarial 
21. In re Donna W., 325 Pa. Super. 39, 58, 472 A.2d 635, 645 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
22. 325 Pa. Super. at 58, 472 A.2d at 645. 
23. This is important when expert opinion shapes the interpretation of facts relevant to appli-
cation of established rules of law. It is imperative when expert opinion informs the development 
or alteration of rules of law. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1600-02. 
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position in litigation; is based upon theoretical premises that are un-
sound; or is based upon factual premises that are inaccurate. The obli-
gation of the legal professional is not automatic deference, but 
respectful, critical scrutiny. 
B. Nonwitness Experts Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right 
The authors accurately observe that in interpreting and shaping 
legal rules legal professionals rely upon information that is extra-judi-
cially acquired. As we have seen, In the Best Interests of the Child 
applauds this sort of boundary crossing; other legal scholarship has 
persuasively established its inevitability.24 
Of course, scientific information acquired outside the courtroom is 
no less fallible than that acquired inside the courtroom. There is a 
consequent risk that independently acquired scientific knowledge will 
be mistaken or incomplete. There is the further risk that it will be 
misused or misunderstood by the legal professional working in an un-
mastered discipline. The authors find the technique of explicating 
premises adequate to address these risks. They offer the case of Ross v. 
Hoffman 25 as a model of appropriate judicial use of independently ac-
quired scientific information. The Ross judge is commended for hav-
ing explicated extra-record scientific premises as he announced his 
decision. In awarding custody to a long-term caretaker pitted against 
a biological mother, the judge noted the reliance upon scientific infor-
mation acquired by judicial notice: 
[T]here is a book out, which is widely read, by three very well respected 
professional doctors, Drs. Goldstein, Freud and Solnick [sic], called 'Be-
yond the Best Interests of the Child' and in that book they point out that 
whether any adult becomes a psychological parent over the child is based 
upon a day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. 
And if you look at it from that view, Mrs. Hoffman has had this 
advantage. 26 
The judge surmised that this theory was what a trial expert "had in 
mind" when he testified that there was risk in moving the child from a 
known to an unknown environment. 27 The action of this trial judge 
24. It is conventional wisdom today to observe that judges not only are charged to find 
what the law is, but must regularly make new law when deciding upon the constitutional 
validity of a statute, interpreting a statute, or extending or restricting a common law rule. 
The very nature of the judicial process necessitates that judges be guided, as legislators are, 
by considerations of expediency and public policy. They must, in the nature of things, act 
either upon knowledge already possessed or upon assumptions, or upon investigation of the 
pertinent general facts, social, economic, political, or scientific. 
E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 928 (3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). See also Davis, 
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 
(1942). 
25. 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), ajfd. as modified, 280 Md. 
172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). 
26. 33 Md. App. at 336-36, 364 A.2d at 599 (quoting the Chancellor below). 
27. 33 Md. App. at 333, 364 A.2d at 600. 
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was affirmed by two appellate courts28 and is applauded by the authors 
as an appropriate crossing of professional boundaries. In the Best In-
terests of the Child reports that this was a case in which scientific 
knowledge not only affected an outcome, but also changed the law: 
The precedent established in Ross v. Hoffman incorporates generally ac-
cepted and generally applicable knowledge from the field of child devel-
opment. These precedents, in some cases, enable lawyers to argue 
against and qualify courts to overturn, without hearing expert testimony, 
the presumption in favor of natural parents. Lawyers and judges on 
their own can come to recognize many "parent" -child relationships that 
should normally not be disturbed. Thus, through judicial precedent the 
borders between the professions are opened and may legitimately be 
crossed under certain circumstances. [p. 60] 
In supporting the Ross outcome and agreeing with its scientific 
premises, the appellate courts and the authors of In the Best Interests 
of the Child have confronted a bypass of legal process and chosen to 
applaud, rather than correct it. It is laudable that the Ross trial judge 
"recogniz[ed] and express[ed] that which helped him to decide."29 
But the expression came too late. Ms. Ross legitimately complained 
that she lacked a pre-decision opportunity to challenge the controver-
sial30 theories upon which her custodial rights ultimately turned. She 
was not alerted to the need to seek or offer expert criticism of psycho-
logical parent theory. She was not alerted to the need to seek or offer 
evidence that it had been misapplied to her situation. If competing 
theories were offered in the appellate process, the opinions give no hint 
of their consideration. The timing of the explication of scientific prem-
ises precluded or compromised use of the mechanisms upon which the 
adversarial system relies to promote accuracy and fairness. 
After-the-fact admission of professional boundary crossing is pref-
erable to silence, but sound decisionmaking and principled develop-
ment of the law require more. They require that the parties be alerted 
to judicial consideration of extra-record scientific information in time 
to refute it. They require inquiry to determine whether the party 
against whom the information is to be used has the resources to evalu-
ate and challenge it. They require that extra-record scientific informa-
tion be tested against a measure of general acceptance within the 
relevant discipline. They require attention to the risks that the imme-
diate parties lack the ability or motivation to address the ramifications 
of enshrinement in precedent of a principle that may be insufficiently 
certain or potent to resolve the range offuture cases to which it will be 
applied. 
28. See note 25 supra. 
29. 33 Md. App. at 338, 364 A.2d at 600. 
30. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.52 
(1977) ("Beyond the Best Interests of the Child ... is indeed controversial."). 
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C. The Sources of Legal Judgments Concerning Scientific Matters 
Are Various and Ambiguous 
In cases, like Ross, in which boundary crossings by law profession-
als are approved, the authors applaud after-the-fact explication and 
unquestioning acceptance of scientific authority. In cases in which 
legal boundary crossings are condemned, the authors identify and de-
nounce an unexplicated result, assuming that full explication would 
reveal no scientific authority to which deference has been paid by law 
professionals. In fact, unexplained scientific opinions offered by law-
yers and judges are often grounded, as the Ross opinion was grounded, 
upon a combination of informally acquired scientific knowledge, com-
mon sense, and lay speculation. The authors' segregation of these two 
categories - appropriately deferential crossing of professional bound-
aries on the one hand and inappropriate inexpert practice of science on 
the other - is misleading. Cases in which judges resort to extra-judi-
cially informed scientific conclusions are more usefully viewed as a 
single category as to which the prescriptions of identification, explica-
tion, and respectfully critical evaluation of scientific opinion should be 
uniformly applied. 
The example of inappropriate boundary crossing, identified by the 
authors as the case of Lisa Stone, illustrates this point. Counsel for a 
child who was the subject of a visitation dispute took the position that 
his client's opposition to visitation by a noncustodial parent was path-
ological (p. 32). Reasoning from their view that psychological parents 
must be autonomous, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have categorically 
opposed court-ordered visitation.31 They find the contrary position of 
the child's attorney unscientific and wrong (pp. 33-34). The authors 
may be right. It may also be that the attorney relied upon indepen-
dently acquired scientific evidence that maximum contact with non-
custodial parents reduces the emotional harm that children suffer as a 
result of divorce.32 It may be that he relied upon a scientist's belief 
that in the bitter aftermath of marital dissolution children are com-
monly influenced, to their emotional detriment, to resent and reject 
the noncustodial parent. 33 These scientific views are differently evalu-
ated and reconciled by different experts. Were the attorney for the 
child to adhere to the limited terms of the prescriptions of explication 
and deference, he would have only to identify scientific authority for 
his views. His obligation is greater. It is to seek out the conflicting 
expert opinions that bear upon his client's situation and subject those 
views to critical evaluation. The corresponding judicial obligation is 
31. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note l, at 116-33. 
32. See, e.g .• GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY No. 106, DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY AND THE FAMILY 882-87 (1980). 
33. See, e.g., Goodstein, Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Divorce and the Psychological Devel-
opment of Children, in OBJECT Loss IN CHILDREN (M. Scharfman ed.) (forthcoming). 
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to assure that this process occurs; that it includes adversarial chal-
lenge; and that the solicitation, evaluation, and advocacy of competing 
expert views is not impeded by resource limitations. 
II. LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
If lawyers lawyer, judges judge, and scientists inform, then inter-
disciplinary collaborations may improve case-specific decisionmaking 
and the development of law. This result is not, however, inevitable. 
As Part I establishes, the principle of boundary adherence wants elab-
oration. Interdisciplinary collaboration is more likely to improve legal 
decisionmaking if information from the sciences is examined critically. 
The story of Carrie Buck gives urgency to the appeal for critical evalu-
ation of scientific opinion. The story of Malcolm X evokes a historical 
legacy that provides the nucleus of an argument that critical judicial 
evaluation of scientific opinion is constitutionally required when 
claims of science challenge claims of family integrity and autonomy. 
A. The Stories of Carrie Buck and Malcolm X 
Carrie Buck appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States 
for protection of her right to bear children. She was the first target of 
compulsory sterilization laws enacted in Virginia in 1924 (p. 132). 
The Court denied Carrie Buck's appeal. Its opinion was grounded in 
scientific evidence that she, her mother, and her only child were 
"imbeciles," (p. 134) and in scientific knowledge that imbecility is her-
itable (p. 134). Declaring that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough,"34 the Court established society's right to "prevent those who 
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."35 It deterred or 
defused constitutional challenge of involuntary sterilizations - of 
which there were 63,678 between 1907 and 1964.36 It has not been 
overruled. 
Scientists working five decades later have concluded that "there 
were no imbeciles, not a one, among the three generations of Bucks," 
(p. 141) and there is now a scientific consensus that although "[s]ome 
forms of mental deficiency are passed by inheritance in family lines, 
... most are not" (p. 133). Yet, the science that underlay the Buck 
opinion was generally accepted in its day,37 and the initial diagnoses of 
Carrie Buck and of her mother were the product of measurement by 
the then relatively new, but altogether respectable Stanford-Binet I.Q. 
34. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
35. 274 U.S. at 207. 
36. Ferster, Eliminating the Un.fit - Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 591, 632 
(1966). 
37. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 832-33 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter J, 
AREEN) (citing HUMAN BETIERMENT AssOCIATION OF AMERICA, SUMMARY OF UNITED 
STATES STERILIZATION LAWS (1952)). 
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test.38 
The story of Carrie Buck may teach nothing more than that scien-
tific insights deepen and improve over time. If this is so, then we may 
rest content in the hope that law grounded in scientific knowledge will 
be altered by reasonably paced responses to scientific advances. Pro-
fessor Gould's telling of the Buck story offers a different lesson and 
calls for a less complacent response: 
When we understand why Carrie Buck was committed in January 1924, 
we can finally comprehend the hidden meaning of her case and its 
message for us today. The silent key, again and as always, is her daugh-
ter Vivian . . . . Carrie Buck was one of several illegitimate children 
borne by her mother, Emma. She grew up with foster parents ... and 
continued to live with them, helping out with chores around the house. 
She was apparently raped by a relative of her foster parents, then blamed 
for her resultant pregnancy. Almost surely, she was (as they used to say) 
committed to hide her shame (and her rapist's identity), not because en-
lightened science had just discovered her true mental status. In short, 
she was sent away to have her baby. Her case never was about mental 
deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and social deviance. 
The annals of her trial and hearing reek with the contempt of the well-off 
and well-bred for poor people of "loose morals." Who really cared 
whether Vivian was a baby of normal intelligence; she was the illegiti-
mate child of an illegitimate woman. Two generations of bastards are 
enough. [An expert witness for the state] began his "family history" of 
the Bucks by writing: "These people belong to the shiftless, ignorant and 
worthless class of anti-social whites of the South."39 
If, as Gould believes, social bias infects and hides behind scientific 
judgments,40 then law professionals are obliged to evaluate scientific 
knowledge with this possibility in mind. The conclusion that "[t]hree 
generations of imbeciles are enough"41 was not simply wrong. It was 
both wrong and too lightly made. The Court dealt with a right that is 
universally cherished.42 Yet, compromise of the right was easily justi-
38. See Ferster, supra note 36, at 603-04. 
39. P. 137. Attorneys for Carrie Buck offered no challenge of her diagnosis or of the herita-
bility of her alleged condition. Brieffor Petitioner, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (No. 292). 
As evidence of the certainty of the scientific underpinnings of the challenged law, Respondent 
offered the opinion of Professor East of Harvard University that "[i]n a quarter of a century laws 
of heredity ... [had] been formulated as definite and precise as those of physics and chemistry." 
Brief for Respondent at 10, Buck v. Bell, supra. 
40. Gould notes in this regard: 
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch, 
vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to 
absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are 
not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we 
see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative 
theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also 
strongly cultural. 
S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981). 
41. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207. 
42. Indeed, the right of procreation was the first right to which the test of strict scrutiny was 
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fied because social bias inhibited deference to a basic human entitle-
ment of the affected class and facilitated acceptance of questionable 
scientific "truths." 
The story of Malcolm X is also the story of state intervention to 
affect the lives of members of a disparaged group. It, too, involves 
family rights of fundamental character. It, too, may involve scientific 
judgments too lightly made. It does not, however, involve a scientific 
judgment now "known" to be wrong. It provides, therefore, a more 
difficult test of the argument for skeptical scrutiny when science is of-
fered to justify limitation of the fundamental rights of a class that is 
the subject of social bias. 
Malcolm X describes a childhood prematurely ended and a family 
divided by the racially motivated murder of his father and the exercise 
of state authority. El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, as he later came to be 
known, spoke with bitterness of the role of the state in the destruction 
of his family. After his father's death in 1931, Malcolm's mother was 
repeatedly fired as white employers learned that she was the widow of 
a "troublemaker." The family was forced to accept welfare payments. 
For Malcolm, these payments represented sustenance less than they 
represented the beginning of a "psychological deterioration [that] hit 
our family circle and began to eat away at our pride."43 We know the 
story of the destruction of the family only through the memory of the 
man who survived it - to become first a petty criminal and then a 
human rights activist of international prominence. It is best told in his 
words: 
When the state Welfare people began coming to our house . . . . 
[t]hey acted and looked at ... [my mother] and at us, and around in our 
house, in a way that had about it the feeling - at least for me - that we 
were not people . 
. . . My mother was, above everything else, a proud woman, and it 
took its toll on her that she was accepting charity. And her feelings were 
communicated to us. 
. . . She would talk back sharply to the state Welfare people, telling 
them that she was a grown woman, able to raise her children, that it 
wasn't necessary for them to keep coming around so much, meddling in 
our lives. And they didn't like that. 
But the monthly Welfare check was their pass. They acted as if they 
owned us, as if we were their private property. As much as my mother 
would have liked to, she couldn't keep them out. She would get particu-
larly incensed when they began insisting upon drawing us older children 
applied. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). The Skinner court described procrea· 
tion as a "basic civil right[ ] of man .... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race." 
43. MALCOLM X & A. HALEY, supra note 10, at 14 (not excerpted in appendix). 
May 1988] Best Interests of the Child 1109 
aside, one at a time, . . . and asking us questions, or telling us things -
against our mother and against each other . 
. . . We really couldn't understand. What I later understood was 
that my mother was making a desperate effort to preserve her pride -
and ours . 
. . . [T]he state Welfare people kept after my mother. By now she 
didn't make it any secret that she hated them, and didn't want them in 
her house. But they exerted their right to come .... 
I think they felt that getting children into foster homes was a legiti-
mate part of their function, and the result would be less troublesome, 
however they went about it. 
And when my mother fought them, they went after her .... 
I'm not sure just how or when the idea was first dropped by the Wel-
fare workers that our mother was losing her mind. 
But I can distinctly remember hearing "crazy" applied to her by 
them when they learned that the Negro farmer who was in the next 
house down the road from us had offered to give us some butchered pork 
... and she had refused .... It meant nothing to them even when she 
explained that ... it was against her religion as a Seventh Day Adventist. 
They were vicious as vultures. They had no feelings, understanding, 
compassion, or respect for my mother. They told us, "She's crazy for 
refusing food." Right then was when our home, our unity, began to 
disintegrate. We were having a hard time, and I wasn't helping. But we 
could have made it, we could have stayed together. As bad as I was, as 
much trouble and worry as I caused my mother, I loved her.44 
A year or so later, Malcolm was placed in a foster home. Eventually, 
his mother was committed to a state mental hospital. Malcolm X de-
scribed the subsequent order making each of her eight children a ward 
of the state as "[n]othing but legal, modern slavery - however kindly 
intentioned. "45 
We have too little information to know whether the intrusion upon 
this woman's parental rights was in th_e best interests of her children. 
We do not know her condition, whether it was objectively diagnosed 
or whether it was appropriately treated. We do not know what assess-
ments were made by mental health and child welfare professionals or 
what theories of child development supported the removal of the chil-
dren and the termination of her parental rights. We do not know 
whether conditions in the household would have been more disabling 
to the children than the trauma of family dismemberment. But we can 
learn from her extraordinary son to appreciate more deeply the value 
of rights lost with the scientific and legal judgments to supplant, rather 
than support, the family. 
44. Id. at 12-18 (portions excerpted in appendix). 
45. Id. at 21. 
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B. The Lessons of the Slavery Analogy 
El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz recalls the orders assigning new familial 
ties for himself and his siblings and equates them to slavery. This is a 
startling insight. It evokes an American historical legacy, a legacy 
that is crucial to appreciation of the appropriate scope of constitu-
tional rights of family: It provides guidance, grounded in history and 
political theory, for legal professionals who must weigh scientific 
claims against fundamental rights of family. It addresses contempo-
rary arguments that certain rights of family are not " 'deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition' "46 and that their enforcement 
"represent[s] choices that the people have never made."47 It therefore 
warrants detailed presentation. 
The relationship between denial of family integrity and slave status 
is well recognized in the scholarship of slavery. Indeed, denial of 
rights of family is regarded as a hallmark of slavery: 
[T]he slave was always a deracinated outsider - an outsider first in the 
sense that he originated from outside the society into which he was intro-
duced as a slave, second in the sense that he was denied the most elemen-
tary of social bonds, kinship. "Quern patrem, qui servos est?" (Plautus, 
Captiva 574). "What father, when he is a slave?"48 
American slavery followed this pattern. 
The condition of the American slave family was a mixed issue of 
law and practice. Descriptions of the relevant law are found in trea-
tises of both uncritical and abolitionist scholars. In the former cate-
gory, Thomas R.R. Cobb, confessing a bias "by . . . birth and 
education in [the] slaveholding State [of Georgia],"49 reported that 
the slave had no legally cognizable right of marriage, family inheri-
tance, or parental custody.so 
46. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 
(1985) (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
47. 476 U.S. at 787. Justice White's dissent in this abortion case reflects a continuing debate 
concerning the validity of the Supreme Court's recognition of unenumerated rights of family 
privacy, integrity, and autonomy. See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 12 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
48. M. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 75 (1980) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
49. 1 T.R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA at X (1858). 
50. "The inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage contract, and hence there 
is no recognized marriage relation in law between slaves." Id. at 242-43. 
The contract of marriage not being recognized among slaves, of course none of its conse· 
quences follow from the contubemial state existing between them. Their issue, though 
emancipated, have no inheritable blood . 
. . . How far this contubernial relation between slaves may be recognized and protected 
by law, is a question of exceeding nicety and difficulty. The unnecessary and wanton separa-
tion of persons standing in the relation of husband and wife, though it may rarely, if ever, 
occur in actual practice, is an event which, if possible, should be guarded against by the law. 
And yet, on the other hand, to fasten upon a master of a female slave, a vicious, corrupting 
May 1988] Best Interests of the Child 1111 
William Goodell, writing as an abolitionist,51 saw the matter no 
differently with respect to the legal rights of slaves: 
"A slave cannot even contract matrimony, the association which 
takes place among slaves, and is called marriage, being properly desig-
nated by the word contubernium, a relation which has no sanctity, and 
to which no civil rights are attached."52 
... "[T]hese laws do not recognize the parental relation, as belonging 
to slaves. A slave has no more legal authority over his child than a cow 
has over her calf."53 
"In the slaveholding States, except in Louisiana, no law exists to pre-
vent the violent separation of parents from their children, or even from 
each other."54 
"Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to another without any 
statutory restriction or limitation, as to the separation of parents and 
children, [etc.], except in the State of Louisiana."55 
Goodell supports the view that slave family relations were no more 
honored in practice than in legai theory.56 Literature of the mid-nine-
teenth century reflects the prevalence of this view and suggests the 
extent to which it influenced abolitionists' understanding of the evils of 
slavery and the importance of family rights to the definition of citizen-
ship. Frederick Douglass, for example, had written that upon the 
death of a master he was: 
immediately sent [forth] to be valued and divided with the other prop-
erty. . . . No one could tell amongst which pile of chattels I might be 
flung. Thus early, I got a foretaste of that painful uncertainty which in 
one form or another was ever obtruding itself in the pathway of the 
slave. It furnished me a new insight into the unnatural power to which I 
was subjected. Sickness, adversity, and death may interfere with the 
negro, sowing discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves; or else a thief, or a cut-
throat, and to provide no relief against such a nuisance, would be to make the holding of 
slaves a curse to the master. 
Id. at 245-46 (citations omitted). 
51. W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (1853) 
("We propose ... by an exhibition of the American Slave Code, to test the moral character of 
American slaveholding."). The work was published by the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society. 
52. Id. at 106 (citing G. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE SLAVE LAWS 61 (1827)) (emphasis in 
original). 
53. Id. at 113 (citing W. JAY, JAy's INQUIRY 132 (2d ed. 1835)). 
54. Id. at 114 (citing G. STROUD, supra note 52, at 50). 
55. Id. (citing J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY 41 (1837)). 
56. Id. at 115-21. Anecdotal accounts portray families separated by sale or distanced by the 
demands of servitude. Advertisements from southern newspapers offer rewards for the capture 
or killing of slaves reported to have run away in order to join family members. For further 
evidence of the frequency of slave family disruption, see authorities cited in J. McPHERSON, 
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 38 (1988). 
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plans and purposes of all, but the slave had the added danger of chang-
ing homes, in the separations unknown to other men . 
. . . One word of the appraisers, against all preferences and prayers, 
could sunder all the ties of friendship and affection, even to separating 
husbands and wives, parents and children. 57 
This aspect of slave life was "the greatest perceived sin of Ameri-
can slavery."58 As such, it was a central concern of abolitionists. Har-
riet Beecher Stowe wrote in 1853 that "[t]he worst abuse of the system 
of slavery is its outrage upon the family; and, as the writer views the 
subject, it is one which is more notorious and undeniable than any 
other."59 An anonymous article in the Antislavery Record of 1836 said 
that "American slavery, both in theory and practice is nothing but a 
system of tearing asunder the family ties, " 60 and described the bonds 
among family members as manifestations of "sacred law which slavery 
scornfully sets at nought."61 
Abolitionists believed that the evils of denying slaves the right of 
family went beyond the deprivation suffered by the slave. 
Families of both races felt the evil effects of slavery;l621 but, more 
57. F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 95-96 (1962) (emphasis 
added). 
58. J. McPHERSON, supra note 56, at 37. 
59. H. STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 237 (1853). Stowe writes in response to 
charges that family separations depicted in Uncle Tom's Cabin were unrealistic or atypical. Her 
evidence of the prevalence of slave family disruption includes eyewitness accounts of family sepa-
rations resulting from slave auctions and advertisements for the sale of slaves. Id. at 259-67, 268-
76. 
60. The Disruption of Family Ties, ANTISLAVERY RECORD, Mar., 1836, at 9 (emphasis in 
original). The author asserts that in slaveholding states, "the principal business by which wealth 
is acquired is the breeding of slaves." Observing that "this trade takes off not usually whole 
families, but the young and the strong," the author says, "[n]ot a slave mother does there live in 
the slave-breeding district, who is not liable to lose her son or her daughter the moment her 
master shall think it for his interest to sell." Id. 
61. Id. at 11. These and other abolitionist views on the family are collected and discussed in 
R. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL (1976). 
62. Abolitionists took the view that slavery corrupted both white and black family values. 
They also argued that slavery inhibited the liberty of whites. Goodell wrote of a slaveholder 
without liberty to control the education of his children. 
Here is a waiting-maid, discreet and pious; or here is a nurse, whom all her owner's 
children call "Mammy." A little knowledge ofletters would qualify one or both of them to 
teach the little white masters and misses their alphabet. . . . [W]here is the legal protection 
of [the owner's] right to select a teacher of the alphabet to his own children? In Louisiana, 
he would be subject to one year's imprisonment for teaching such a slave to readl He enjoys 
liberty, does he? 
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 374. This liberty interest was subsequently recognized as being 
embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In further support of the argument that slavery compromised the 
family values of whites, Goodell cited an incident apparently much discussed among his 
contemporaries: 
Look then at the dying Thomas Jefferson, the penman of the declaration that "all men 
are created equal," now penning a clause of his last will and testament, conferring freedom 
(as common report says) on his own enslaved offspring, so far as the Slave Code permitted 
him to do it, supplying the Jack of power by "humbly" imploring the Legislature of Virginia 
to confirm the bequests, "with permission to remain in the State, where their families and 
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important, so did society. "The Family is the head, the heart, the foun-
tain of society," proclaimed one abolitionist, "and it has not a privilege 
that slavery does not nullify, a right that it does not counteract, nor a 
hope that it does not put out in darkness." 
Destruction of the home fit with slavery's symbolic function as the 
exemplar of what could go wrong with society.63 
The attention abolitionists gave to the slave family paralleled an 
attentiveness throughout antebellum America to the institution of the 
family. It reflected a belief - held within and without abolitionist 
circles - that the family was not only sacred, but also the foundation 
of social order and moral development and the source of individual 
comfort and satisfaction. 64 
It was in this context of general concern for the family as a social 
institution and particular concern for the deprivation of slave family 
rights that Congress addressed the slavery question. Family rights 
were an explicit concern when Congress acted, through the thirteenth 
amendment, to abolish slavery. Family rights were an explicit concern 
when Congress acted, through the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Freedmens' Bureau Bill, to define the rights of freedmen and other 
national citizens. Family rights were therefore encompassed when 
rights of national citizenship were given constitutional status with rati-
fication of the fourteenth amendment. 65 
connections are" - then dying, under the uncertainty whether his requests would be 
granted or his children sold into the rice swamps! 
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 375. The literature of the time also included de Tocqueville's 
account of an 
old man, in the South of the Union, who had lived in illicit intercourse with one of his 
Negresses and had had several children by her, who were born the slaves of their father. He 
had, indeed, frequently thought of bequeathing to them at least their liberty; but years had 
elapsed before he could surmount the legal obstacles to their emancipation, and meanwhile 
his old age had come and he was about to die. He pictured to himself his sons dragged from 
market to market and passing from the authority of a parent to the rod of the stranger, until 
these horrid anticipations worked his expiring imagination into frenzy. 
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY JN AMERICA 380 (P. Bradley ed. 1956). 
63. R. WALTERS, supra note 61, at 58. 
64. It is surprising, but important, that feminists and anti-feminists, abolitionists and anti-
abolitionists, reformers and anti-reformers all directed their attention to the same institution. 
Rather than being a mere sentimental convention, concern for the family was bound up with the 
most serious social and cultural debates in antebellum America: 
Virtually everybody assumed that, when properly structured, the family was crucial to 
social stability and to social improvement .... There was ... more unity here than mere 
ritual expression of the importance of family life: the family, and relationships usually com-
prehended within it, were almost uniformly presented as vehicles of social and individual 
salvation. 
Walters, The Family and Ante-helium Reform: An Interpretation, 3 SOCIETAS 221, 225 (1973). 
65. The fourteenth amendment was designed to give constitutional status to the rights con-
ferred by the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau legislation of 1866. This is "[t]he one point 
upon which historians of the Fourteenth Amendment all agree, and indeed, which the evidence 
places beyond cavil." tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200 (1951). 
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1. The Thirteenth Amendment Debates 
Concerns for the protection of family rights were regularly re-
flected in the debates concerning the thirteenth amendment. 66 The de-
bates reflected more than concern regarding the condition of the slave 
family. They reflected also the conviction that the familial rights de-
nied to the slave were fundamental and inalienable. The remarks of 
Congressman Ingersoll are typical: "I believe that the black man has 
certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the sight of Heaven as 
those of any other race ... and no white man has any right to rob him 
of or infringe upon any of these blessings. "67 Senator Sumner asked 
that his colleagues imagine an extraterrestrial visitor beholding the 
spectacle of slavery: 
[A]stonishment ... would swell to marvel as he learned that in this 
republic, which has arrested his admiration, where there was neither 
king nor noble, but the schoolmaster instead, there were four million 
human beings in abject bondage, degraded to be chattels, ... despoiled of 
all rights, even the right of knowledge and the sacred right of family; so 
that the relation of husband and wife was impossible and no parent could 
claim his own child. 68 
Senator Wilson declared that upon ratification of the thirteenth 
amendment 
The sharp cry of the agonizing hearts of severed families will cease to vex 
the weary ear of the nation . . . . Then the sacred rights of human na-
ture, the hallowed family relations of husband and wife, parent and 
child, will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law which makes 
sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of freedom. 69 
66. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1865): 
The slave could sustain none of those relations which give life all its charms. He could not 
say my home, my father, my mother, my wife, my child, my body. It is for God to judge 
whether he could say my soul. The law pronounced him a chattel, and these are not the 
rights or attributes of chattels. 
(statement of Rep. Creswell); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) ("[Slavery] has 
destroyed the sanctity of marriage, and sundered and broken the domestic ties.") (statement of 
Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 221 (1865) 
It is strange that an appeal should be made to humanity in favor of an institution which 
allows the husband to be separated from the wife, that allows the children to be taken from 
the mother; ah! that allows the very children of the deceased slaveholder himself to be sold 
to satisfy his merciless creditors. 
(statement of Rep. Broomall); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) ("It has been 
asserted ... that this thing, slavery, was of divine origin .... What divinity [is there] in tearing 
from the mother's arms the sucking child, and selling them to different and distant owners?") 
(statement of Rep. Shannon); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864) 
[T]he condition of ... slaves has been attended with circumstances which not only deprive 
them of the common blessings that they were by nature entitled to, but has cast them into 
the deepest affiictions, by an unnatural separation and sale of husband and wife from each 
other and from their children .... " 
(statement of Rep. Kelly) (quoting the Preamble to an Act for the abolition of Slavery in 
Pennsylvania). 
67. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864). 
68. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1479 (1864). 
69. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864). 
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Senator Harlan described and condemned as contrary to natural law 
the "incidents of slavery." The first two incidents related to rights of 
family. The Senator spoke first of marriage: 
Some of the incidents of slavery may be stated as follows: it necessarily 
abolishes the conjugal relation. . . . [I]n none of the slave States was this 
relation tolerated in opposition to the will of the slave-owner . . . . 
The existence of this institution therefore requires the existence of a 
law that annuls the law of God establishing the relation of man and wife, 
which is taught by the churches to be a sacrament as holy in its nature 
and its designs as the eucharist itself. 70 
Senator Harlan spoke next of the parent-child relationship: 
Another incident is the abolition practically of the parental relation, 
robbing the offspring of the care and attention of his parents, severing a 
relation which is universally cited as the emblem of the relation sus-
tained by the Creator to the human family. And yet, according to the 
matured judgment of these slave States, this guardianship of the parent 
over his own children must be abrogated to secure the perpetuity of 
slavery.71 
For Harlan, and for other abolitionists, the slaveholder's claim of 
property rights was illegitimate because it stood in conflict with supe-
rior and "inalienable" human rights of the slave - rights that were 
"sacred," denied only by laws "shocking to human nature itself," 
rights that were "holy," "necessary to the preservation of virtue in 
civil society," and emblematic of the relationship between God and 
man. Representative Farnsworth put it in these terms: 
What vested rights [are] so high or so sacred as a man's right to himself, 
to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own indus-
try? Did not our fathers declare that those rights were inalienable? And 
if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how can another man 
alienate them without being himself a robber of the vested rights of his 
brother man?72 
The status attributed to family rights by proponents of the thirteenth 
amendment was asserted even more clearly by Congressman Kasson: 
[T]here are three great fundamental natural rights of human society 
which you cannot take away without striking a vital blow at the rights of 
white men as well as black. They are the rights of a husband to his wife 
- the marital relation; the right of father to his child - the parental 
relation; and the right of a man to the personal liberty with which he was 
endowed by nature and by God, and which the best judicial authorities 
of England have for a hundred years declared he could not alienate even 
by his own consent. 73 
70. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864). 
71. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864). 
72. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865). 
73. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865). 
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2. The Debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
Congressional debate concerning the reach of the thirteenth 
amendment did not end with the amendment's passage. 
The congressional battle that raged around ... [the Civil Rights Bill 
and the Freedmen's Bureau Act] constituted ... [an] important debate 
over the Thirteenth Amendment. By the Amendment, the principle of 
universal liberty had been established. The Freedmen's Bureau and Civil 
Rights bills represented the efforts of the Amendment's framers, acting 
contemporaneously with its ratification, to implement the Amendment 
and define the principle.74 
Implementation of the amendment involved containment of the effects 
of the Black Codes, by which Southern states sought to perpetuate 
incidents of slavery. These codes included measures that compro-
mised the family rights of former slaves.75 When Congress acted to 
invalidate the Black Codes and to interpret and enforce the thirteenth 
amendment guarantee of liberty, family rights were again addressed. 
In these debates, as in the thirteenth amendment debates, members of 
Congress explicitly recognized the fundamental importance of family 
rights to the concept of freedom: 
Slavery cannot know a home. Where the wife is the property of the 
husband's master, and may be used at will; where children are bred, like 
stock, for sale; where man and woman, after twenty years of faithful 
service from the time when the priest with the owner's sanction by mock 
ceremonies pretended to unite them, are parted and sold at that owner's 
will, there can be no such thing as home. Sir, no act of ours can fitly 
enforce their freedom that does not contemplate for them the security of 
74. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 186. 
75. The codes uniformly provided for the legitimization of slave marriages. H.R. EXEC. 
Doc. No. 118, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). However, Senator Windom reported from corre· 
spondence describing the Black Codes of Mississippi that "Section third [of the freedmen's bill] 
compels all freedmen to marry whomsoever they may now be living with, and to support the 
issue of what was in many cases compulsory cohabitation.'' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1160 (1866) (quoting from letter from Lt. Stewart Eldridge to Maj. Gen. Howard (Nov. 28, 
1865)). In some jurisdictions, slavery was effectively continued through the device of making 
black children the wards or apprentices of whites. The procedure by which this was done dif· 
fered from apprenticeship arrangements involving white children in that parental consent was 
not required. An example oflegislation establishing this device was offered by Senator Sumner to 
illustrate the evils of the Black Codes. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 93 (1865). Senator 
Donnelly reported that "[t]he black code of Tennessee provides that ... children [of the vagrant 
Negro] may be bound out against his wish to a master by the county court .... " CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 589 (1865). Similar apprenticeship arrangements were held, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice Chase, sitting in the Circuit of Maryland, to violate the thirteenth amendment. 
In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D.Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). Turner has been incorrectly cited 
as an opinion of the Supreme Court abolishing these apprenticeship practices. See, e.g., H. GUT· 
MAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 410 (1976). The effect of Turner is not 
entirely misperceived as a result of this error. An excerpt from a subsequent district court opin· 
ion, transmitted to Congress in 1868, says of the case, "This decision ... will govern me in all 
future applications of a similar character, unless a different opinion shall be pronounced by the 
Supreme Court." S. Misc. Doc. No. 24, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1868). 
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home.76 
The first version of the Civil Rights Act spoke in terms of discrimi-
nation, prohibiting "any inequality of civil rights and immunities 
among the inhabitants of [former Confederate] States."77 Senator 
Sherman proposed that the Act be amended to "secure to the freed-
men of the southern States certain rights, naming them, defining pre-
cisely what they should be, [and including] the right ... to be 
protected in their homes and family [as a] ... natural right[] of free 
men."78 Senator Sumner also urged specification of the rights of freed-
men, including among them the rights "to contract marriage, and to 
make any arrangement whatever concerning their family affairs .... " 79 
The Act was amended to specify rights to which freedmen were 
entitled. The specification included the rights 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property, as it is enjoyed by white citizens, and ... 
[to] be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
other.80 
It was understood that the rights of contract, 81 of property82 and of 
equal benefit of laws3 encompassed rights of marriages4 and family 
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2779 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot, speaking with 
respect to the homestead provisions of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill). 
77. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865). 
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865). 
79. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865) (quoting regulations accompanying the 
1861 Proclamation emancipating the serfs of Prussia). 
80. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865). 
81. The deprivation of all slave family rights was traced to denial of the right to enter the 
contract of marriage. See note 50 supra. 
82. Rights of family were, in the nineteenth century, regarded as aspects of the property 
rights of men. The language of Representative Wood, speaking in opposition to the thirteenth 
amendment, illustrates the point. "The social and domestic relations are equally matters of indi-
vidual ownership with flocks and herds, houses and lands. The affections of a man's wife and 
children are among the dearest of his possessions, and as such are under the protection of the 
law." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864). 
83. The application of the equal protection concept to family rights is illustrated in the full 
text of the debates cited at note 84 infra. 
84. The understanding that the thirteenth amendment and enforcing legislation affected the 
right to marry sparked heated controversy in the Freedmens' Bureau Bill debates over the pros-
pect of miscegenation. In this context, we find two congressmen denying that the right to marry 
was conferred by the language of the bill. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866) 
(statement of Rep. Moulton, denying that the right of marriage was a civil right within the 
meaning of the Freedmens' Bureau Bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix at 75 
(1866) (statement of Rep. Phelps, denying that the Bill encompassed a right to marry). But most 
who spoke on the subject argued or acknowledged that the bill affected marriage rights. Oppo-
nents of the bill complained against its scope. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 
(1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks, arguing that "[m]arriage is a civil contract, and to marry 
according to one's choice is a civil right"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) 
(statement of Sen. Johnson, arguing that the right to make and enforce contracts encompasses 
the right of interracial marriage); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 418 (1866) (statement of 
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integrity. 85 
The thirty-ninth Congress went beyond assuring former slaves the 
enumerated rights set forth in the Civil Rights Act (and, in slightly 
modified form, in the fourteenth amendment). It made them citizens. 
Rights of family were understood not only as components of rights of 
property, contract, and equal protection, but also as components of 
the liberty interests inherent in citizenship status. Senator Trumbull 
offered the amendment to the Civil Rights Act that conferred citizen-
ship rights upon freedmen. 86 His subsequent remarks describe the in-
tended scope of the rights to be conferred: 
It is difficult, perhaps, to define accurately what slavery is and what lib-
erty is. Liberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the 
other . 
. . . Civil liberty ... is thus defined by Blackstone: 
"Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by 
human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public." That is the liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled . . . . 87 
When consideration of the Trumbull amendment resumed on the fol-
lowing day, Senator Howard responded to those who argued that Con-
gress lacked the authority to enforce general citizenship rights in 
behalf of freedmen; he spoke specifically of rights of family: 
[The slave] had no rights, nor nothing which he could call his own. He 
had not the right to become a husband or a father in the eye of the law, 
he had no child, he was not at liberty to indulge the natural affections of 
the human heart for children, for wife, or even for friend . 
. . . Is a free man to be deprived of the right of acquiring property, of 
the right of having a family, a wife, children, home? What definition will 
you attach to the word "freeman" that does not include these ideas? The 
once slave is no longer a slave; he has become, by means of emancipa-
tion, a free man. If such be the case, then in all common sense is he not 
entitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is free?88 
Sen. Davis, arguing that the right of interracial marriage is a consequence of the law). Support-
ers of the bill acknowledged that the right to marry was implicated, and addressed the miscege-
nation fear by positing a "separate-but-equal" approach to marriage rights. CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden, arguing that "[the black man] has the 
same right to make a contract of marriage with a white woman that a white man has with a black 
woman"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 322, 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull, 
arguing that the right of marriage, encompassed by the bill, did not include the right of interra-
cial marriage). 
85. Rights of family integrity were understood to flow from the right to create a family by 
marriage. See note 50 supra. 
86. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 474 (1866). 
87. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added). 
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 504 (1866). 
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3. The Fourteenth Amendment - A Third Force in Law-Science 
Interactions Touching Family Life 
In this country, the meaning of citizenship developed with refer-
ence to the experience of slavery. It was in the process of abolition 
that rights of national citizenship were articulated and given protec-
tion against encroachment by the states. The fourteenth amendment 
assured the constitutional status of fundamental rights that were iden-
tified in the thirteenth amendment debates as having been trampled by 
slavery, and decreed by the civil rights legislation of 1866 to be the 
entitlement of free people. 89 
The debates of the thirty-eighth Congress have prompted the ob-
servation that "[t]he opposite of slavery is liberty."90 Denial of rights 
of family is of the essence of slavery. It was a prominent and uniquely 
detestable feature of American slavery.91 Appreciation of the need to 
protect rights offamily is a legacy of the progression from a slavehold-
ing nation to a nation in which citizenship is a human birthright. 
The fourteenth amendment, understood as an embodiment of that 
legacy, serves to insulate rights of family. When claims of science 
seem to justify curtailment of those rights, special scrutiny is required 
to test the objectivity and accuracy of the scientific judgment and the 
balance between liberty lost and public policy advanced. Scrutiny of 
this sort would have heightened judicial appreciation of the value to 
Carrie Buck of the liberty to bear children and the value to Malcolm 
X's family of the right to survive as a family. Scrutiny of this sort 
would have encouraged critical judicial examination of scientific prog-
noses with respect to the unborn children of Carrie Buck and the up-
rooted children of Malcolm X's mother. 
Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein have enriched the store of 
scientific knowledge upon which lawmakers may draw in advancing 
the public good and promoting the interests of children. Their unex-
plained offering of the stories of Carrie Buck and Malcolm X suggests 
that they sense the dangers of uncritical reliance upon that knowledge. 
Both the science and the dangers must be appreciated. Law-science 
collaborations that affect fundamental rights require more than that 
89. See notes 73-88 supra and accompanying text. 
90. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 179. 
91. The legacy of this feature of slavery is described from the perspective ofa principal char-
acter in Toni Morrison's novel of motherhood and slavery: 
Anybody Baby Suggs knew, let alone loved, who hadn't run off or been hanged, got rented 
out, loaned out, bought up, brought back, stored up, mortgaged, won, stolen or seized .... 
What she called the nastiness of life was the shock she received upon learning that nobody 
stopped playing checkers just because the pieces included her children. Halle she was able 
to keep the longest. Twenty years. A lifetime. Given to her, no doubt, to make up for 
hearing that her two girls, neither of whom had their adult teeth, were sold and gone and 
she had not been able to wave goodbye .... "God take what He would," she said. And He 
did, and He did, and He did .... " 
T. MORRISON, BELOVED 23 (1987). 
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lawyers and scientists know their respective places. They require criti-
cal analysis of the competing claims of science and law; humble evalu-
ation of the power of scientists to know; and cautious delineation of 
the rights and responsibilities of individuals, functioning within the 
"private realm of family life"92 and of the collective, acting upon sci-
entific knowledge to assure or enhance the well-being of its members. 
92. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943). 
